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Abstract 
We analyse the endogenous choice of the competition mode (price vs. 
quantity) in a duopoly model with managerial delegation and unionised 
labour markets. Depending on the unions’ relative bargaining power and the 
degree of product differentiation, the set of possible outcomes proves to be 
very rich, including alternatively a unique quantity or price equilibrium as 
well as multiple asymmetric-type equilibria. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In this note we analyse the strategic (endogenous) choice between quantity or price competition in a 
two-tier vertical structure where downstream firms’ owners delegate strategic decisions to managers 
and marginal production costs (i.e., wages) are bargained between managers and upstream suppliers 
(i.e., unions). 
The pioneering work by Singh & Vives (1984) has given rise to a vast literature analysing 
the effects of Bertrand and Cournot competition on profits and welfare. Various extensions deal 
with the comparison between Bertrand and Cournot outcomes, aiming at assessing if Singh & 
Vives’ (1984) seminal results on profits and welfare rankings (i.e., Bertrand competition leads to 
higher consumer surplus and overall welfare, while Cournot competition entails higher profits when 
firms compete in substitutes and lower profits when they compete in complements) still apply in 
alternative frameworks.1 Instead, less attention has been originally devoted to Singh and Vives’ 
result that the firms’ choice to compete in quantities is the symmetric equilibrium in dominant 
strategies with substitute goods.2 
More recently, the analysis of the non-cooperative game on the choice of strategic variable 
in duopoly has becoming a fruitful research topic and different works tackle this issue in various 
contexts (e.g., Correa-López, 2007; Matsumura & Ogawa, 2012; Chirco & Scrimitore, 2013; 
Scrimitore, 2013; Tremblay et al., 2013; Bhattacharjee & Pal, 2013; Pal 2015; Basak & Wang, 
2016). This paper aims at contributing to this literature by considering the interplay between the 
separation of ownership from management in modern corporations and the role of labour unions in 
determining workers’ wages.3 
Our main findings can be summarised as follows: i) the choice to compete in quantities, 
originally pointed out by Singh & Vives (1984) in a standard duopoly framework, is generally 
reversed; and ii) a wider set of possible (equilibrium) outcomes also applies with respect to the 
received literature on endogenous competition in oligopoly, which extends Singh & Vives’ (1984) 
original model. The intuition behind those results can be understood by considering that, together 
with the standard “competition effect” highlighted by the received literature on managerial 
                                                
1 Just to mention some relatively recent examples, see Correa-López & Naylor (2004), Zanchettin (2006), 
Mukerjee et al. (2012) and Alipranti et al. (2014). 
2 Under complement goods, instead, the symmetric equilibrium is competing in prices. 
3 In Industrial Organization, the managerial delegation literature started with the pioneering works by 
Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985), Fershtman & Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987). Horn & Wolinsky (1988), 
Davidson (1988) and Dowrick (1989) originated instead the literature on unionised oligopolies. 
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delegation with exogenous costs, according to which owners provide incentives on sales to 
managers, another important effect plays a role when labour markets are unionised, determining the 
equilibrium owners’ choice of the bonus weight in managerial contracts. This effect, that can be 
labelled “wage effect” (Fanti & Meccheri, 2013, 2015), refers to the fact that by providing 
incentives on sales, owners drive managers to increase output and therefore employment. In turn, 
this also reduces labour demand elasticity and, as a consequence, leads unions to increase their 
wage claims. Hence, according to this (novel) effect, owners have a rationale to penalise their 
managers on sales in order to dampen the unions’ wage claim. 
However, while under Cournot the wage effect is in conflict with the (standard) competition 
effect and generally the former prevails on the latter so that, in equilibrium (and in contrast with the 
standard literature), owners choose to penalise sales, under Bertrand the competition effect and the 
wage effect strengthen each other, determining a larger negative bonus weight. In turn, stronger 
sales penalisation under Bertrand also implies lower wages (further than lower output), leading to a 
reversal of the standard outcome that profits are higher under Cournot. Furthermore, this makes 
price contracts the only (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium for a wide range of structural 
parameters’ values. In particular, only when unions’ relative bargaining power is low and product 
substitutability is high, the standard competition effect outweighs the wage effect (which is 
negligible when unions’ power is very low) and standard outcomes are restored: profits are higher 
under Cournot and quantity contracts are the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Moreover, as 
it will be clarified, this line of reasoning also explains why, for some combinations of unions’ 
relative bargaining power and product differentiation, there is room for profitable unilateral 
deviations from symmetric strategies, also making the presence of two asymmetric Nash equilibria a 
possible event. 
It is worth discussing here also the main differences between this work and the companion 
paper (Fanti & Meccheri, 2015), where the same issue of the endogenous competition mode is 
analysed in an alternative framework. In particular, the relevant change with respect to our previous 
work is twofold. First, while in Fanti & Meccheri (2015) it is assumed that unions have all the 
bargaining power (i.e., a monopoly union model is adopted), we consider now wage bargaining 
between unions and firms. Since the unions’ relative bargaining power captures in this context the 
weight assigned to the wage effect, this can permit to clarify in greater detail the role of this effect 
in determining the final outcomes. Secondly, and most importantly, in this paper the firms’ owners, 
instead of managers, take the choice of the competition mode. As we will show, this modification is 
crucial in determining the main results; while the standard quantity choice equilibrium always 
applies when the competition mode is chosen by managers (Fanti & Meccheri, 2015), we obtain 
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herein, as above discussed, a much richer set of possible (endogenous) equilibria, so significantly 
modifying the standard results inherited by Singh & Vives (1984). This is because, from the one 
hand, owners and managers have their own objective functions, which differ one another and, from 
the other (and more interestingly), they choose the competition mode at different stages. Crucially, 
in Fanti & Meccheri (2015) managers choose the competition mode just prior to the market stage 
(when wages have already been set). In this paper, instead, we consider a situation in which owners 
can chose the competition regime before wage bargaining. Hence, while, in the former case, there is 
no room for managers to strategically choose the competition mode in order to influence wage 
determination (even when managers’ payoff is linked to profits/sales by means of an incentive 
contract), in the latter, owners have two different tools to affect wages: managerial incentive 
contracts and competition mode. This makes the situation more complex, leading to a much more 
elaborated (and completely different) result in relation to the endogenous choice of the competition 
mode. 
The remaining part of the work is organised as follows: the basic framework is presented in 
Section 2; Section 3, which is the core of this note, analyses and discusses the endogenous choice 
by firms’ owners of the competition mode; finally, Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2 Basic framework 
 
The model set-up builds on Fanti & Meccheri (2015) that considers a duopoly market where two 
identical firms produce differentiated products. The inverse demand for firm producing variety i is 
given by: 
 
€ 
pi(qi,q j ) =1−qi − γq j       (1) 
 
where pi denotes the price of variety i, qi and qj the outputs by the two firms (with i, j = 1, 2 and i ≠ 
j), and γ ∈ (0,1) the degree of product differentiation.4  
The cost function of the firm i is given by 
€ 
Ci(qi) = wi li = wi qi, where li represents the 
number of workers employed by the firm and 
€ 
wi <1 the wage per unit of labour. Hence, profits are 
€ 
π i = (pi − wi)qi , which, taking (1) into account, become: 
                                                
4 The (inverse) demand structure represented by (1) is a normalised version of that originally introduced by 
Dixit (1979) and adopted by Singh & Vives (1984). 
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π i = (1− qi −γqj −wi )qi . 
 
We also assume that each firm’s owner hires a manager and delegates the strategic decisions 
in the products market game about quantity or price to this manager. The compensation perceived 
by each manager includes two components, a fixed salary plus a bonus element. The latter is related 
to a weighted combination between firm profits and sales/output (e.g., Vickers, 1985; Lambertini, 
2000; van Witteloostuijn et al., 2007). Formally manager i receives a bonus that is proportional to: 
 
ui = π i + biqi = (1− qi −γqj −wi + bi )qi     (2) 
 
where 
€ 
bi  is the incentive parameter that is chosen by the firm i’s owner. The owner may provide 
either incentives or disincentives to the manager’s choice of output (sales), so that the parameter 
€ 
bi  
may be either positive or negative. Particularly, the firm i’s manager partially abandons the rule of 
the strict profit-maximisation for taking also into account sales when  ≠ 0. As a consequence, 
he/she may become a more (when 
€ 
bi > 0) or less (when 
€ 
bi < 0) aggressive seller in the market.5 
Moreover, managers are also delegated to bargain wages with labour unions, which are interested to 
their workers’ total wage bill. 
In the sequel we analyse the choice of the strategic variable taken this market environment. 
In particular, we consider a four-stage game, where the type of market contract (quantity or price) is 
selected at the first (pre-play) stage by the firms’ owners; at the second stage, owners decide bonus 
weights in managerial contracts; at the third stage, wages are bargained between unions and 
managers; at the final stage (the market game), managers compete according to the market contract 
choosing the strategic variable. As usual, the game is solved by backward induction. 
 
2.1 Symmetric choice 
 
In this section, we consider first the cases in which owners make symmetric choices about the 
market contract. When both firms (managers) compete à la Cournot, in the market game, the firm 
i’s manager maximises (2) with respect to qi. Since firms’ managers behave symmetrically, the firm 
i’s output, for given wages and bonuses, is given by: 
                                                
5 Extensions to other types of managerial delegation schemes, such as “relative performance delegation” 
(e.g., Miller & Pazgal, 2002; Chirco et al., 2011), are left to the future research. 
€ 
bi
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€ 
qi(wi,w j ,bi,b j ) =
2 − γ − 2wi + γw j + 2bi − γbj
4 − γ 2 .   (3) 
 
 Instead, when in the market game both firms compete à la Bertrand, taking (the inverse of) 
(1) into account, the firm i’s manager maximises his/her utility with respect to pi. Then, taking into 
account that j behaves symmetrically (and considering (1)), the firm i’s output, for given wages and 
bonuses, is: 
 
€ 
qi(wi,w j ,bi,b j ) =
2 − γ − γ 2 − (2 − γ 2)wi + γw j + (2 − γ 2)bi − γbj
(1− γ 2)(4 − γ 2) .  (4) 
 
At the third stage, unions and managers bargain over wages. In particular, it is assumed that 
each manager-union pair bargains according to the Right-to-Manage (RTM) model. Since unions 
are interested to their workers’ total wage bill Vi = wiqi, a wage wi is determined through bargaining 
to maximise the following generalized Nash product:6 
 
max
wi{ }
= Ni =Viβui1−β = (wiqi )β[(1−wi − qi −γqj + bi )qi ]1−β  
 
where β ∈ (0,1) represents the unions’ relative bargaining power vis-à-vis managers which, for 
simplicity, is assumed to be the same for both unions. Accordingly, taking (3) or (4) into account, 
sub-game perfect symmetric equilibrium wages under Cournot and Bertrand competition at the final 
stage are, respectively: 
 
wi (bi,bj ) =
β (βγ 2 −8)bi − 2γ (β − 2)bj + (γ − 2)(βγ + 4)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
(βγ + 4)(βγ − 4)  
wi (bi,bj ) =
β (βγ 2 − 2γ 4 +8γ 2 −8)bi +γ (γ 2 − 2)(β − 2)bj + (γ + 2)(γ −1)(βγ − 2γ 2 + 4)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
(βγ + 2γ 2 − 4)(βγ − 2γ 2 + 4) . 
 
At the second stage, by substituting back wages and output in the profit equation, owners 
simultaneously choose the bonus weights in managerial contracts that maximise profits: 
                                                
6 The pioneering work that provides a rationale for the adoption of the Nash bargaining solution in strategic 
contexts is Binmore et al. (1986).  
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bi = bj = bQ = −
(γ 4 −8γ 2 )β 2 + (8γ 2 +32)β −16γ 2
2 (γ 4 +γ 3 − 4γ 2 )β 2+(16− 2γ 3 − 4γ 2 −8γ )β −8γ 2 +16γ +32⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
 
bi = bj = bP = −
(γ −1) (3γ 4 −8γ 2 )β 2  + (32− 4γ 6 + 20γ 4 − 40γ 2 )β + 4γ 2 (γ 2 − 2)2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
(3γ 5 − 2γ 4 −10γ 3 +8γ 2 )β 2 − 2(γ 2 − 2)(2γ 5 −γ 4 − 9γ 3 + 6γ 2 +12γ −8)β +Ψ  
 
where Ψ≡ 4(γ 2 + 2γ − 4)(γ 2 − 2)2  and the indexes Q and P recall that the bonus weights refer to the 
case with quantity and price competition, respectively, in the product market.7 Finally, by 
substituting back, we obtain the (sub-game perfect) equilibrium output, wage and profit of each 
firm, the latter being reported below relative to the two competition modes: 
 
π i = π j = π
Q =
(β − 2)(βγ 2 −8) (γ 4 − 6γ 2 )β 2 + (4γ 2 +16)β −16γ 2 +32⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2 (γ 4 +γ 3 − 4γ 2 )β 2 + (16− 2γ 3 − 4γ 2 −8γ )β −8γ 2 +16γ +32⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2  
π i = π j = π
P =
2(β − 2)(2−γ 2 +β)(γ −1)(γ 2 − 2)(−2γ 4 +βγ 2 +8γ 2 −8)(βγ 4 −3βγ 2 − 4γ 2 +8)
(1+γ ) (3γ 5 − 2γ 4 −10γ 3 +8γ 2 )β 2 − 2(γ 2 − 2)(2γ 5 −γ 4 − 9γ 3 + 6γ 2 +12γ −8)β +Ψ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2 . 
 
 
2.2 Asymmetric (price/quantity) choice 
 
Let us now assume that firm (manager) 1 competes in price (as a Bertrand-type firm), while firm 
(manager) 2 in quantity (as a Cournot-type firm). Again, managers take their strategic choices 
simultaneously under complete information. Firms face symmetric inverse demand and cost 
functions and differ only in their choice of strategic variable. The Nash equilibrium of the market 
stage can be described in terms of the best-reply functions for each firm’s manager, respectively: 
 
p1(q2,w1,b1) =
1−γ 2 +w1 −γq2 (1−γ 2 )− b1
2−γ 2 ; q2 (p1,w2,b2 ) =
1−γ −w2 +γ p1 + b2
2−γ 2  
 
                                                
7 Notice that, while the standard outcome under price competition that owners always penalise managers on 
sales is confirmed, owners penalise sales also under quantity competition provided that β is sufficiently high. 
This reverses the received outcome that, when competition is in quantities, owners provide their managers 
with incentives on sales. We defer to Fanti & Meccheri (2013, 2015) and Meccheri & Fanti (2014) for 
greater details. 
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and standard calculations lead to the firm i’s output, for given wages and bonuses: 
 
q1(w1,w2,b1,b2 ) =
2−γ − 2w1 +γw2 −γb2 + 2b1
4−3γ 2    (7) 
q2 (w1,w2,b1,b2 ) =
2−γ −γ 2 +γw1 − (2−γ )w2 + (2−γ 2 )b2 −γb1
4−3γ 2 .  (8) 
 
By using (7) and (8), maximising the Nash product with respect to wi and solving the 
system, we get the following sub-game perfect equilibrium wages, as a function of the bonus 
weights: 
 
w1(b1,b2 ) =
β (βγ 2 + 4γ 3 −8)b1 +γ (γ 2 − 2)(β − 2)b2 +βγ 3 +βγ 2 − 2γ 3 − 2βγ + 4γ 2 + 4γ −8⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
β 2γ 2 +8γ 2 −16 ; 
w2 (b1,b2 ) =
β (4γ − 2βγ )b1 + (βγ 2 + 4γ 2 −8)b2 +βγ 2 − 2βγ + 4γ 2 + 4γ −8⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
β 2γ 2 +8γ 2 −16 . 
 
Hence, by substituting wages back, we get profits as a function of the weights on sales only. 
By maximising with respect to bi and solving the system of reaction functions in bonus weights 
space, we obtain the equilibrium weights on sales b1 = bP/Q and b2 = bQ/P, where the superscript P/Q 
(Q/P) recalls that it is obtained when the firm competes in price (quantity) while the rival competes 
in quantity (price). Finally, by substituting back, we get the corresponding equilibrium profits π1 = 
πP/Q and π2 = πQ/P.8 
 
 
3 Strategic choice of the competition mode 
 
Given the solutions of the above sub-games, we can now turn to the choice of quantity vs. price at 
the first (pre-play) stage of the game. In particular, we assume that at the pre-play stage firms’ 
owners simultaneously and independently decide the type of contract (price or quantity) offered to 
customers. The payoff matrix at the pre-play stage is as follows: 
                                                
8 Since equilibrium bonus weights and profits of this case are very cumbersome and not manageable, we 
omit them for economy of space. [They have been submitted in a separate appendix, as additional material 
for referees.] 
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owner i \ owner j Quantity Price 
Quantity πQ, πQ πQ/P, πP/Q 
Price πP/Q, πQ/P πP, πP 
 
Table 1: Endogenous competition choice: strategic form 
 
Proposition. In the presence of managerial delegation contracts and unionised labour markets, 
the following applies: 
 
• when unions bargaining power is not too much low and product substitutability is not too 
much high, the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) entails that both owners 
choose to offer a price contract at the first stage. Furthermore, for a large set of parameters 
for which this applies, this equilibrium is Pareto-efficient from the firms’ owners viewpoint; 
 
• when unions are sufficiently strong in bargaining vis-à-vis managers and product 
substitutability is sufficiently high (but not too high when bargaining power is roughly 
equally distributed), there are two asymmetric SPNE at the first stage, with one owner 
offering a price contract and the other owner a quantity contract; 
 
• when unions’ bargaining power is sufficiently low and product substitutability is sufficiently 
high, the only (Pareto-efficient) SPNE entails that both owners choose to offer a quantity 
contract at the first stage. 
         
Proof: Let define the following profits differentials: Δ1 ≡ πQ/P – πP, Δ2 ≡ πP/Q – πQ and Δ3 ≡ πP – πQ. 
Then, the proof of Prop. 1 is provided by Figure 1 considering that:9 Δ1 < 0∪Δ2 > 0∪Δ3 > 0  applies 
in region A; Δ1 < 0∪Δ2 > 0∪Δ3 < 0  applies in region B; Δ1 > 0∪Δ2 > 0∪Δ3 < 0  applies in region 
C; and Δ1 > 0∪Δ2 < 0∪Δ3 < 0  applies in region D. 
 
                                                
9 Since the profit differentials are only functions of the parameters β and γ, then their 2-D graphical analysis 
is exhaustive to prove their signs, despite they are polynomials of very high degree (all graphical analyses 
are derived in MAPLE; details and programs are available from the authors upon request). 
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Figure 1: Regions defining endogenous competition modes according to β  and γ    
 
Hence, in region A and B the only SPNE is (P, P) which is, however, Pareto-efficient only 
in region A; in region C there are two asymmetric SPNE (P, Q; Q, P); in region D (Q, Q) is the 
only (Pareto-efficient) SPNE.         □ 
 
3.1 Discussion 
 
The results above obtained, as summarised by our main proposition, and in particular the variety of 
possible equilibrium outcomes relating to the choice of the competition mode, are novel with 
respect to the received literature.10 Hence, it is worth discussing in greater detail the logic, in this 
framework, behind them. In particular, in order to explain the (endogenous) choice of the 
competition mode, it is crucial to analyse carefully what applies in the asymmetric configurations 
when the price setter and the quantity setter are, respectively, on their Cournot and Bertrand 
reaction functions. 
                                                
10 See, in particular, the works that, by considering (separately) a vertical structure or strategic delegation, are 
closer to ours (Lambertini, 2000; Correa-López, 2007; Chirco & Scrimitore, 2013; Bhattacharjee & Pal, 
2013; Pal, 2015; Basak & Wang, 2016). Also notice that while we have analysed here a framework with 
decentralised firm-union bargain, we obtain the same rich set of equilibrium outcomes also when 
unionisation (bargaining) is centralised (results available upon request to authors). 
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 Firstly, recall that in a standard framework with profit-maximising firms and competitive 
labour markets (i.e., without unions), asymmetric configurations lead to the price setter’s quantity to 
be lower and its price to be higher than those of the rival, with higher profits accruing to the 
quantity-setter (Singh & Vives, 1984, p. 550). As also pointed out by Chirco & Scrimitore (2013) in 
a different context, introducing managerial delegation by itself modifies this situation in a relevant 
way. On the one side, it makes (symmetric) quantity and price competition respectively less 
profitable and more profitable. On the other side, in the asymmetric configurations, managerial 
delegation “enhances the aggressiveness of the price setter, while it damps down that of the quantity 
setter, thus causing the profits of the former to increase and those of the latter to decrease” (Chirco 
& Scrimitore, 2013, p. 485). However, when labour markets are not unionised (i.e., no “wage 
effect” is present), Cournot profits keep on dominating Bertrand profits, and no incentive to 
unilaterally deviation from quantity-quantity to price-quantity applies.11 Hence, the role of the 
“wage effect” becomes essential to explain our results. In other words, together with managerial 
delegation and the choice of incentive contracts, the choice of the competition mode is now a 
strategic tool for firms’ owners to dampen the unions’ wage claim.12 
 In particular, from the literature on unionised oligopolies, we know that: i) equilibrium 
wages are higher under Cournot than under Bertrand because the (sub-game perfect) labour demand 
schedule in the latter regime is more elastic than in the former, leading unions to mainly moderate 
their wage claims when firms compete in prices; and ii) a unit increase in wage reduces equilibrium 
profits more in Cournot than in Bertrand (e.g., Correa-López & Naylor, 2004, pp. 690-692). This 
opens up to the opportunity for unilateral deviations to price competition, which is reinforced in a 
context with managerial delegation. This is because, under Bertrand, the competition effect and the 
wage effect strengthen each other, leading to a larger negative bonus weight for manager and, as a 
consequence, lower (endogenous) wages. Indeed, as long as β becomes sufficiently high, hence the 
“wage effect” sufficiently strong, owners first perceive an incentive to unilaterally deviate from the 
quantity-quantity choice (the asymmetric choice being an equilibrium) and then, if the products are 
                                                
11 This can be verified by considering the sign of the profit differentials in the region D when β → 0, as 
reported in the proof of our proposition. 
12 As already discussed in the Introduction section, this represents the key-difference with respect to Fanti & 
Meccheri (2015), where managers (instead of owners) choose the competition mode just before the market 
competition stage, when wages have already been set by unions. In that case, even if in theory managers are 
interested to affect wages due to the presence of incentive contracts, they must take wages as given when 
decide the competition mode. As a consequence, the standard result of endogenous quantity competition is 
never reversed. 
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not strictly substitutes (i.e., γ is not too high), they move towards a symmetric price-price 
equilibrium. However, the advantage for owners to keep on competing in prices reduces as product 
substitutability increases. Indeed, as γ increases, the standard competition effect becomes stronger 
and, when γ → 1, profits collapse to zero under price competition due to the “Bertrand paradox”. 
Hence, it is profitable for a firm unilaterally deviate from price-price to quantity-price. This 
completes the explanation of why also a region with two asymmetric equilibria does exist in this 
context. 
  
 
4 Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have analysed the endogenous choice of the competition mode (price vs. quantity) 
in a duopoly model with managerial delegation and unionised labour markets. Depending on the 
unions’ relative bargaining power and the degree of product differentiation, the set of possible 
outcomes has proved to be very rich, including alternatively a unique quantity or price equilibrium 
as well as multiple asymmetric-type equilibria. In particular, these findings crucially depends on the 
fact that the owner initially decides on the mode of competition, hence having also this strategic 
tool (in addition to that of the manager’s bonus) to affect union’s wages Such results are novel, 
hence they contribute to extend the literature that investigates the endogenous choice of the 
competition mode in oligopoly markets. In order to extend such results, future research could be 
carried out by considering other managerial incentive structures, such as “relative performance 
delegation”, or by introducing incentive contracts bargaining between owners and managers into the 
analysis. 
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